< IMG SRC = "https://img7.ccement.com/richtext/img/a5irfltmsaq1707270168893., an industry that once played an important role in China's economy, is also the economic pillar of many countries." It has even become the basis for the construction of political and economic order. Through field research, the
author finds that in West Africa today, the emerging cement industry is acting as a lever to liberate the "growth potential" and create conditions for the rise of a new generation of local political and business elites. In the process of rapid urbanization, the cement industry is the foundation of infrastructure, and its influence even surpasses the original oil industry. West Africa's concrete value chain is reshaping the region's political and economic model on an unprecedented scale.
The author believes that the expansion of the "concrete city" model also reflects the change of the unequal relationship between the North and the South in the world. In the past, multinational companies grabbed a lot of investment and trade gains, but under the new capitalism of "combination of government and business" in Africa, local political and business elites have risen and formed alliance networks, among which the best have even begun to launch reverse m ergers and reshape "North-South relations". With the retreat of neoliberal influence, a new governance model seems to be emerging in West Africa: the government centralizes the promotion of infrastructure projects, enterprises respond to the call to speed up the landing, and the people vote according to the results of their achievements.
The author points out that the emerging African billionaires are no longer "in a corner". Some of them have thrown themselves into politics, trying to replicate Trump or Berlusconi's "way of the head of state". They also invest in overseas markets and participate in the wider global economy. Against the backdrop of West Africa's "concrete cities", a new geopolitical map has been unveiled.
This article is the tenth of the series of original compilations of cultural vertical and horizontal new media, "The inside story and strategy of key regional countries". Translated from Armelle Choplin, Concrete City: Material Circulation and Urbanization in West Africa (Material Flows and Urban isation in West Africa, Vol. Published 2023 by John Wiley & Sons Ltd. The article only represents the views of the author and is for readers' reference and analysis. The "political economy of concrete"
in
West Africa In 2017, the CEO of Benin's largest cement factory, NOCIBE, finally decided to grudgingly invite me to the company's headquarters office in Cotonou to discuss the future of the booming concrete industry.
"I'm not going to tell you anything about cement," he warned me. "In our industry, we don't talk about cement. Cement is secret. What on earth needs to be hidden in
such an ordinary and ubiquitous material? Looking back on history, concrete has also accompanied human development, promoting the reproduction of capital and the consolidation of political power.
Looking back to West Africa today, I will explore the relationship between concrete, politics and economics in this time and space: how does the cement industry and the concrete value chain drive urban development? How did the "concrete city" come about?
Concrete has become the key element of Foucault's "government". African countries need revenue from the private sector, such as construction (real estate), to consolidate their domination of the national population. National governance also depends on the substance of concrete, legitimizing authority through constant construction projects, from buildings, bridges, and dams, to asphalt roads, intersections, and other infrastructure.
In the memory of Africans, cement, a "grey gold" that once needed to be imported in large quantities, is now a pillar industry supporting economic growth. In the public eye, the industry has even shaped the latest examples of African development, such as Aliko Dangote, the "richest man in Africa". The political economy of concrete reveals the symbiosis of government and business: presidents eager to see construction projects land quickly, local officials looking for resources, financiers and cement companies looking for profits, ambitious businessmen who fancy themselves philanthropists. They are the face of "Africapitalism".
"Grey Gold": The Course
of "Africanization" of Cement (1) From Colonial Import to "Made in Africa"
Cement is not a new thing in Africa. Before the establishment of local cement factories, European settlers would bring their own cement to build early colonial towns in coastal areas. In 1890, cement accounted for a quarter of Benin's imports; by 1930, it was the main building material in colonial housing. In the 1950s, along with "wheat flour, canned goods, wine and liqueurs," cement remained a major import.
European colonists believed that concrete was safer, stronger and more modern than the traditional plant buildings of Africans. The isolation brought by the colonizers is also reflected in certain toponyms: in Maputo, Mozambique, the Portuguese architectural heritage is called the "city of cement" (Cidade de cimento), while the poor, unplanned area is called the "city of reeds" (Cidade de cani caniço). To this day, cement blocks have gradually replaced straw, bamboo and clay, as well as Brazilian earthen buildings introduced by Latin American former slaves, from residents'choice to legal requirements.
During the colonial period, France and Britain were reluctant to invest in expensive cement plants on a large scale. Until 1930, the first cement factory in West Africa was opened in the coastal town of Rufisque, Senegal, the forerunner of today's SOCOCIM.
It was one of the first integrated cement plants in the region. Unlike the more common mills of the time, the cement for the integrated cement plant was produced from a local limestone mine. Once extracted, the limestone is mixed with clay in a ratio of 80-20. The material is heated to 1450 ° C to produce what is known as "< a href =" https://price.ccement.com/Price_list-1-s0-e0-p0-c0-k100059-b0., which is then ground and mixed with gypsum. Made into a gray powder we call "Portland cement.". Only the second stage of mixing clinker and gypsum is carried out in the grinding plant, where the raw materials are often imported from Europe or North Africa.
Integrated cement plant production process
< IMG src="https://d.ifengimg.com/w1080_h221_q90_webp/x0.ifengimg.com/res/2024/41C6F02FA99E470B3A339D75DFA29CC5093F1046_size37 _ w 1080_ h221. In the West African region, obtaining an adequate and continuous supply of electricity is complicated, and there are few limestone deposits. As a result, it was not until 1961 that Nigeria built the first Evecoro cement plant, which is now owned by the African subsidiary of the Franco-Swiss cement giant Lafarge Holcim. In 1978, Benin's Onigbolo Cement Plant (now SCB Lafarge) began construction 100 kilometers away.
With the establishment of these integrated cement plants, grinding plants that are easier to set up are also being built and expanded. Clinker, cement and gypsum are all major imports, so grinding plants are often close to ports: in 1967, the Benin Cement Company (SCB) was established near the dock in Cotonou; in 1969, the Togo Cement Company (Cimtogo) was established next to the port in Lomé.
The African cement industry chain took a huge turn in the 1980s. Previously, due to higher energy and investment costs (1.5 to 2.5 times) and overcapacity, the local < a href = "https://price.ccement." in Africa began to fall with the global economic crisis in the 1970s, the European construction market overcapacity and the expansion of exports to Africa. This also laid the foundation for its investment and construction in the early 21st century.
(2) Patriotic consumption and national identity
In the second decade of the 21st century, at least 15 integrated cement plants opened in West Africa. Companies such as LafargeHolcim and Germany's Heidelberg Cement have led the investment, with Africa's homegrown Dangote also a prime mover. Limestone in
West Africa is limited but of good quality. Similar to Zambia's once rich copper belt, there is now a "limestone belt" in West Africa, from Togo to Nigeria via Benin, which will shape the future of the region's industry. In addition to the original grinding plant, the major cement giants have set up factories along the mining belt to supply the local and surrounding markets without limestone mines. The lack of energy (especially electricity) needed to heat the kilns
in the relevant areas is the biggest obstacle to building the plant. As a result, Heidelberg has in the past preferred to import clinker from China or Indonesia and process it in mills near the ports of Lomé and Cotonou. Despite addressing mineral sources, African cement plants remain highly dependent on external raw materials: petroleum coke from Venezuela for kilns and gypsum from Spain for blending. Because the price of external raw materials has a great impact on the cost of cement, large enterprises are more inclined to build comprehensive factories.Cement plants
around the Gulf of
Guinea < IMG src="https://d.ifengimg.com/w640_h310_q90_webp/x0.ifengimg.com/res/2024/B11EB3D7BF2D448B3B1A87166C558D7D655D593A_size47_ W 640_ h310. Cement has been Africanized for nearly 60 years, and many people in the region will be proud to buy and use "indigenous" cement, as it is one of the few commodities produced locally.
While concrete is a global commodity, in Africa it is strongly associated with regional and national identity. Cement companies have also developed an argument that the consumption of "domestic cement" is patriotic. Africa has few benchmark industries or visions similar to those of other industrial countries, and concrete has been given a special symbolic meaning.
(3) "Africa's Richest Man": The Rise
of Cement Tycoon Dangote, the founder and CEO of Dangote Industries, in his autobiography "The Richest Black Man in the World". "To build a successful business, you have to start small and dream big," said Aliko Dangote, who once expressed his professional beliefs in simple but grand terms. According to the book, Mr. Dangote built a business empire by selling three truckloads of cement with the help of his uncle and grandfather. In just two decades, he became the leading cement producer in Africa, the richest man in Nigeria and Africa, and even the 25th richest man in the world.
In Africa's cement industry, Dangote has successfully overturned the dominant position of large European multinational enterprises. Founded in 1977, the company currently operates more than 10 integrated cement plants employing more than 30,000 people in 10 countries (Nigeria, Cameroon, Congo, Ethiopia, Ghana, Senegal, Sierra Leone, South Africa, Tanzania and Zambia). Dangote can realize the whole chain from mining to terminal sales, with a total production capacity of 51.55 million tons in 2021. The company's three cement plants in Nigeria (Obajana, Ibese and Benue) have an annual output of 29.3 million tons, controlling 65% of the country's cement market and having pricing power.
Since April 2020, Dangote has added $4 billion to the company's revenue through rising cement prices and large government-backed oil refining projects. In 2021 alone, with Nigeria's housing and infrastructure sectors "booming," Dangote Cement's share price rose by 30% and his personal wealth increased. 14
. Dangote is the only African on Bloomberg's list of the world's 50 most influential people. His wealth, family and success are examples of the struggles of many West Africans, and he can even be said to be among the "world elite". In March 2018, he held a wedding ceremony for his daughter in Lagos. Bill Gates and other "global celebrities" even came to the scene, and each guest was given a Rolex watch as a souvenir. Inspired by him, the dreams of local male youth are no longer limited to star footballers-cement producers have a bright future too. For women, the VIP Dutch wax cloth produced by the company has gradually become the brand representative of luxury fashion.
Dangote created a new model for the African cement industry: owned by Africans, raw materials obtained and processed in West Africa, and even stopped importing. Although certain raw materials are imported, the end product has become the representative of "Made in Africa" and is even expected to reverse the status relationship with the former colonizer. Dangote had previously hinted at plans to buy English Premier League football club Arsenal, and in 2019, President Macron invited Dangote to invest in France. Cement "Business"
in
Africa (1) Cement Enterprises "Horse Race Enclosure"
in Africa In the distance, at the end of a newly laid red earth track, a brand-new cement plant is emerging from the African Savannah. I looked at the time on the dashboard of the pickup truck, and I was late. Even though I started at dawn, the journey from Cotonou took longer than expected. I'm a little nervous. The CEO of NOCIBE once warned me, "I don't have much time; we can only communicate between 8:30 and 9:00 in the morning." When
I entered the office, the CEO asked me, "Do you know who invented cement?" "When was it invented?" He seemed satisfied with my answer, smiled, then invited me to sit down and offered to show me around the company's new cement factory, quarry and residential area of about 50 families. The meeting ended at 1 p.m.
Since the 2010s, LafargeHolcim, HeidelbergCement, Dangote and others have competed fiercely in the West African market. Other competitors include CDS Cement (owner of the NOCIBE factory in Benin) and Amida Group (owner of SCB Bouclier in Benin and the Ciments d 'Abidjan in Côte d'Ivoire) from Senegal, India's WACEM (owned by India's Diam Cement and Ireland's Fortia Group), Morocco's CIMAF Group, Turkey's Limak Group, or Burkina Faso's Kanazo Kanazoé Group. The capacity expansion of
comprehensive cement plants and grinding plants has triggered fierce market competition, and mergers and reorganizations have occurred from time to time. Onigbolo, one of the oldest cement plants in Benin, was founded in 1978 as a joint venture between Benin and Nigeria. In 1998, the government of Benin sold 51% of its shares to Lafarge, while Nigeria sold 43% of its shares to Dangote. Benin retained a 6% stake in the plant and the name of the plant was changed to SCB-Lafarge.
Dangote group is undoubtedly the most influential cement giant in West Africa. According to its official website, Nigeria has 2. In response to growing demand, the company has three large cement plants: the Obajana plant in Kogi State, which opened in 2008, is the largest in sub-Saharan Africa, with an annual output of 13.25 million tons; The Benue plant in Ogun State was the first to be established (2007), with an annual output of 12 million tons, mainly supplying eastern Nigeria and Cameroon; the Ibese plant in Ogun State, near the Benin border, also has an annual output of 12 million tons. Dangote helped Nigeria become "self-sufficient" in cement and later became the continent's leading exporter.
Dangote's Ghanaian subsidiary began operations in 2010 and now directly or indirectly provides jobs for 5,000 people. The company's 10-hectare site in Tema, Ghana's main port, is used to set up logistics platforms for trucking and packaging operations to export products to Burkina Faso, Mali and Ivory Coast. In 2020, an integrated cement plant will begin construction in Takoradi, which will compete with India's Diam Cement's Ghanaian subsidiary, which is building a plant in Aflao, just a few hundred meters from the Togolese border and the capital city of Lomé.
The group has made no secret of its ambitious plans and publishes a strategy report every year to elaborate on them. In 2015, the group opened a new factory outside Dakar, in direct competition with the SOCOCIM factory owned by France's Vicat Group. 30% of the capacity of the SOCOCIM plant is exported, particularly to Gambia and Mali. At the same time, Dangote plans to continue opening new factories in Niamey and Kao, Niger.
In 2015, Heidelberg Cement strengthened its presence in West Africa with the opening of its clinker production facility Scantogo in Tabligbo, the capital of Togo, 80 km from Lomé. The plant is able to supply clinker to grinding plants in Lomé, Cotonou, Ouagadougou and Tema. The group has taken over the plants from Norway's SCANCEM, a state-owned company, since 1999. In addition, the group has three cement plants in Burkina Faso, the latest of which started in 2015 near the capital Ouagadougou, with an annual output of 800,000 tons, which is expected to increase to 1.7 million tons soon. The Kara plant in Togo is doubling its capacity. In Benin, the plant has expanded significantly, and nearly 20% of its output is exported to Niger. Heidelberg is not only the third largest cement producer in West Africa, but also the largest gravel producer in the region-its Granutogo gravel plant, 72 kilometers from Lomé, has a daily capacity of 1000 tons.
(2) "The price of cement is like the stock market."
"The price of cement is like the stock market. It changes every day," Joel, a local retailer, explained to me. His daily job is to record the price of each ton of cement.
Over the past five years, as new factories have opened, supply shortages have given way to overcapacity, driving down prices in the region. However, despite intense competition, the average cement price in Africa is still 183% higher than in the rest of the world. The average also masks large differences across West Africa: in Benin, the cost per tonne of cement fell from 110,000 CFA francs in 2014 to 67,000 CFA francs (about $100) in November 2017, the lowest in the surrounding countries.
Table 1: Cement price
per ton in 2020 < IMG src="https://d.ifengimg.com/w691_h108_q90_webp/x0.ifengimg.com/res/2024/78382F52904810787B16772D14FC85755924B624_size28_ w691_h108.In Benin, the official price of a ton of cement is still 90,000 CFA francs in 2014, but the retail price can be as high as 110,000 CFA francs. With the opening of the NOCIBE cement plant, prices began to fall, in line with what the government, financiers and citizens had been expecting. "There used to be a black market and cement smuggling," Pascal, a merchant
in Porto-Novo, told me. People go to Nigeria to buy cement and smuggle it back. The smuggling of cement between Benin and Nigeria, like the smuggling of low-grade fuel, was previously a common phenomenon, which was particularly evident when the Nigerian naira was devalued. However, since the opening of the NOCIBE plant, cement smuggling has decreased dramatically.
The Beninese government provided the plant with a tax exemption to help it maintain its "ex-factory" price, resulting in an initial decrease of CFAF 5,000 per ton and a further decrease of CFAF 25,000 per ton over the next six months. Competitors have no choice but to readjust their prices. Some enterprises began to denounce unfair competition and call for more government intervention. The sales director of SCB Bouclier advocated that "the state should strengthen market supervision" and that he could "barely break even". During the same period, Lafarge's Onigbolo plant has also reduced its workforce from 500 to 380 over the past 10 years. According to the plant director, the problem is not capacity: "The plant produces about 500,000 tons per year.". It can produce more, but there is a risk of oversupply and price collapse.
In fact, the major cement producers are careful to avoid producing at full capacity. In the face of competition, they began to close the point of sale, forcing the distribution market to reorganize. In Benin, lower prices are not a bargain for Dangote, who has bought more than 43% of SCB Lafarge from the Nigerian government. Several presidents in Benin, however, have refused to allow Mr. Dangote to sell cement in the country. However, in 2018, there were rumors that the situation might change. In fact, if Nigeria can allow Beninese businesses to sell cement in the country, there is no reason for the Beninese government to block Dangote. Price controls in
Togo remain in force, with the unit price maintained at 82,000 CFA francs. However, there is nothing to stop companies from dumping. That's exactly what Mr. Dangote wanted to do in the fall of 2016, when he offered to sell at a unit price of 65,000 CFA francs. When the Togolese government refused, a heated debate broke out in the National Assembly, with more than a few lawmakers siding with Dangote. However, the Togolese government is adamant that it wants to protect scarce areas of local production, such as rice, cereals and cement. A similar situation occurred in Ghana in November
2016. The Cement Manufacturers Association of Ghana (CMAG), led by local producer Ghacem and India's Diam Cement, has publicly called for a boycott of Dangote Cement. Mr. Dangote's Ghanaian subsidiary defended that it had paid the tax and that the company had stabilized local cement prices. Dangote also points out that the two companies employ just 3,000 people after 55 years in the Ghanaian market, while Dangote has 2,000 employees in six years.
In Senegal, the price of cement is set by the government. However, driven by major projects such as the highway from Dakar to the new city of Diamniadio, the price of cement in the country has soared to about 3,500 CFA francs per bag, compared with the official price of 2,900 francs per bag. The government found itself unable to control prices and could only hope that market prices would fall voluntarily after Dangote's factory increased production. However, Dangote said publicly that he would continue to improve quality rather than reduce prices, which attracted widespread criticism from the media and the public.
Although West African cement producers are often able to engage in dialogue through industry associations, relations between them are very tense. Everyone is complaining about the unfair practices of competitors. The CEO of Cimtogo, for example, is very annoyed with Dangote: "To win the market, Dangote relies on scale.". The company almost dumped at cost and profited by scale. We can't compete with such a giant because he can get support from all sides. A war between Russia and Ukraine in 2022 could even have an impact on the price of cement, with the average unit price rising from 60,000 to 80,000 CFA francs. The continued volatility in cement prices has fueled intense competition and the widespread circulation of "grey gold" in West Africa.
(3) "Always on the road": Cement and truck logistics
One day in September 2016, I saw nearly 300 Dangote trucks carrying cement on the Togole-Benin border. They are all registered in Ghana. I can't help but wonder where these loaded trucks come from? Three days later, I saw them again, this time empty, in the industrial suburb of Accra and in the port of Tema. In May
2016, Aliko Dangote acquired a logistics platform in Tema as a distribution point for his cement production in Nigeria. From here, cement can be exported not only to Ghana, but also to Burkina Faso, Ivory Coast and Mali, where prices are much higher. To this end, Dangote purchased 1500 trucks from China Heavy Truck in July 2016, and the two sides also established a joint venture in Nigeria to assemble trucks for cement transportation. The truck assembly plant is located in Ibes, less than 100 kilometers from the capital of Benin, Porto-Novo.
Almost every night, you can see trucks passing through the center of Ibes, heading for the port of Tema, Ghana, 500 kilometers away. Each fleet consists of 400 trucks, each loaded with 50 tons of cement. The driver is Ghanaian, and only one driver is responsible for carrying all the documents and operating the relevant procedures, aiming to prevent individual drivers from negotiating in private and limit possible corruption. Officially
, Dangote claims its expansion strategy is well-intentioned: the goal is to lower prices and make cement affordable everywhere. However, this may be just an excuse to expand into new markets. Nigeria has been going through an economic crisis since July 2016. The naira has depreciated significantly, making the export price of Nigerian cement very competitive. Cement smuggling on the Benin-Nigeria border soon became frequent, which meant access to larger West African markets for Dangote. After several rounds of negotiations with the governments of Togo and Benin, Dangote was granted market access and was able to take over the rapidly expanding cement plant in Ghana.
Dangote Group uses a "vertically integrated" structure that allows it to control production and distribution. The strategy has far-reaching spatial implications: 3,500 trucks crisscross West African roads, and the company opens production and distribution sites on the outskirts of remote cities, where cement prices are rising fastest relative to population. Vertical integration allows Dangote to control the entire industry and radiate influence to all regions.
As part of the expansion plan, Dangote Group signed an agreement with the Nigerian government in 2020 to rebuild concrete roads across the country. Vertical integration also insulates Dangote from possible disruptions by logistics companies, particularly lobbying and strikes. Mastering transportation also allows Dangote to respond quickly to demand, not only for government contracts, but also for private construction sites. In this sense, Dangote has also led the transformation of Africa's logistics industry. Dangote's motorcade is not "alone" on the coastal roads of
West Africa. There are also 700 "Buffalo" trucks, loaded with Heidelberg Cement products, which are sold from the plant in Tablibo, Togo, to the branches in Benin, Togo, Niger and Burkina Faso. The fleet belongs to Illiassou Moumouni, a wealthy Nigerien businessman who has a long-term transport agreement with HeidelbergCement, and the German group says it has no plans to vertically integrate its transport business. The sales director of Cimb Cimbénin, a subsidiary of Heidelberg Cement, said to me, "We are in the business of cement, not logistics". The CEO of Cimtogo also emphasized this point, and 20% of the company's logistics is handled by the "Buffalo" fleet. Rumor has it
in the West African business community that Mumuni owns as many as 2,000 trucks and never goes on the road empty. Mumuni's father is a second-hand clothes dealer, and he started working as a motorcycle taxi driver in the 1980s. Rumor has it that he is good at finding any product and selling it at a high profit. While in Cotonou, he used to sleep on his motorcycle in front of the cement factory. Between 1985 and 2004, he settled at Malanville, the border crossing between Benin and Niger, selling a variety of products. Starting in 2004, he moved to the port of Gaya and began selling and shipping cement with Charfo, then one of Niger's largest cement wholesalers. In
addition, there is an important carrier named Gado in the cement industry in Togo. He bought the goods of Dangote's fleet at a unit price of 66,000 CFA francs, and then in the local market, 8.
Logistics is the basis. Roads are no longer a means to solve isolated problems, but a necessary condition for transportation speed and profitability, and cement is a core commodity that is accelerating. Despite the high cost of transporting heavy materials, cement continues to flow across borders in flatbed trucks, canoes or motorcycles, and cement companies have accelerated trade. The trend is also reflected in export figures: cement and clinker are Benin's fifth largest exports, after cotton, cashew nuts, oil and petroleum, with annual exports amounting to 14.4 billion CFA francs, the main destinations being the Niger (60%) and Burkina Faso (40%).
Cement has become ubiquitous, sold on both sides of the main road, on every street corner, at every construction site, on the outskirts of the city, in containers and pickup trucks. The sales director of Ciment Bouclier emphasizes, "Our goal is to be close to our customers and make sure that they can find cement wherever they are.". The director of SCB Lafarge also said: "Distribution has changed: buyers are no longer willing to look for products that have to be delivered to them.".
In Ivory Coast, LafargeHolcim has developed Binastore, a local distribution network based on franchising. Cement manufacturers are carefully cutting out middlemen to avoid diluting profits and cope with falling prices. "The trend is to reduce the number of official outlets and work with private wholesalers through a franchise system," said the director of SCB Lafarge.We are now only responsible for 15% to 20% of the delivery tasks. As a result, cement manufacturers are cultivating small retail markets and arguing that they have created more new jobs for the West African economy.
(4) The slogan is loud: "All for development"
. Africa's urbanization needs are increasing, especially in housing and infrastructure. In this context, cement manufacturers claim to have made outstanding contributions to regional development: providing materials for houses, laying asphalt for roads, building schools and hospitals for everyone, thus promoting national economic development. West African politicians are also actively promoting this narrative, repeatedly arguing that concrete is a central component of Africa's current rise. The passion for cement has been shaped into a consensus: it not only serves the interests of economic development and the rich, but also improves the living conditions of the poor. Cement companies such
as Dangote have presented themselves as important sponsors of urban development. Dangote claims to "enrich the lives of Africans" by producing "vital and irreplaceable" materials. LafargeHolcim emphasizes the contribution of social housing programs to building inclusive cities and has funded the 14Trees program to provide so-called "decent" housing, as well as launching DuraBric products aimed at the population of poor suburbs. In Kenya, Holcim has delivered the largest 3D printed affordable housing project in Africa, claiming that it has solved the most pressing housing problem in Africa. ?
Cement companies are eager to be actively involved in solving local social problems and say that the so-called "environmental, social and governance" (ESG) factor is not charity, but part of their business strategy. Heidelberg Cement's foundation has launched a series of measures to "support community development": providing cement for the construction of schools, health centers and other infrastructure, such as wells and roads. LafargeHolcim has taken a similar approach, building a school near the Onigbolo cement factory. Dangote emphasized its role in driving local employment. NOCIBE also sponsored the Tour de Benin, offering two tons of cement as a prize.
However, the move is often referred to as "Greenwash", which aims to offset the negative impact of the cement industry on the local environment. But whatever the outside world's evaluation, all actions show that cement companies have become full participants in the affairs of African cities. On top of
concrete, a new African elite emerges
(1) Cement industry: leverage
to "unlock Africa's growth potential" Since the 2000s, international organizations and aid agencies have begun to publicly support the cement industry. The World Bank sees it as a lever to fight poverty and "unlock Africa's potential", while the Franco-German state aid agency provides loans for new cement plants. The agencies agreed that the price of cement could be reduced through competition, and that labor-intensive factories would provide income and livelihood for the poor in Africa. For example, the French Development Agency (AFD), through its private investment company Proparco, invested 20 million euros in the project of Limak, a Turkish company, to set up a factory on the outskirts of Abidjan; DEG, a subsidiary of the German Development Bank, also supported the project.
In addition, these institutions also link the cement industry with the economic development of the city. UN-HABITAT argues that mega-cities, urban corridors and metropolitan areas can make a significant contribution to global economic production. In the context of globalization and neoliberal development, cities are "bigger is better". This conclusion comes from the experience of the Western world, but the World Bank and other institutions believe that it is also applicable to the global South, and it is included in the Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs) in September 2015 and the report of the United Nations Habitat III Conference in October 2016.
Therefore, regional development banks such as the African Development Bank and the Islamic Development Bank are also actively financing urban, transport and infrastructure projects in West Africa. Obviously, all of the above projects require a lot of concrete. Inspired by the Schengen model, West Africa is also promoting regional economic integration, and large road arteries are the basis for the circulation of people and goods. The Abidjan-Lagos Corridor (CORAL) is representative, with 75% of the region's economic activity along its route. Thanks to the tariff and policy support of the surrounding governments, a large amount of cement is also transported along this corridor.
Dangote Group and its strategy are an important part of regional economic integration, which is strongly supported by the African Union (AU) and the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS). Dangote's goal of "localizing" concrete production is consistent with the principles of the African Union, and ECOWAS provides Dangote with a fairly favorable regulatory framework. Diam Cement of Ghana has said that "Dangote has received 30% of Nigeria's export expansion subsidy program and tax exemption from ECOWAS".
Through a series of institutional arrangements, Dangote Group's fleet can easily cross the borders of Nigeria, Ghana and Niger without being bound by tariffs. Officially, the company pays taxes at the state level in advance, thus avoiding the relatively more "corrupt" border exploitation. Unofficially, the company is likely to have brokered a deal with politicians.
Through the concrete, we can see the turning of the government, the game of transnational alliances, and the strategy of the private sector. Without the strong support of the government and the management, no cement plant can be opened. In addition, there are risks and benefits, and if foreign capital is to be attracted, the government must provide more financial support, so it is logical to support capable local enterprises.
(2) The President is also a "builder" and an "entrepreneur"
who "often builds, sometimes destroys, but always serves"
-the slogan
of a construction site near the government building in Cotonou, Benin, in 2017. Patrice Talon has been hoping to "clean" the main roads by removing street vendors, and government officials have echoed the idea of "action to liberate the public sphere". Many residents, however, called it an "eviction.".
Tallon is trying to "modernize" Benin's economic capital to compete with other big African cities. "Cotonou is competing with Abidjan and Accra," he told the media in 2016. As part of the Talloon administration's "Benin Dream," the "builder" president has embarked on a construction drive to urbanize, providing large-scale investment in road infrastructure, social housing programs, smart cities, new airports, riverine and coastal development, and "urban sanitation projects.".
In Benin, as elsewhere, political leaders are making their mark as "builders" and winning the support of voters through infrastructure projects. In this sense, the head of state is like the chief representative of "attracting investment," which also reflects the transformation of the image of African countries in recent years, from the budgetary constraints imposed by the Bretton Woods institutions in the past to the promotion of development through highly symbolic infrastructure projects.
At the same time, the image of presidents is also integrated with the projects they initiate, thus falling into the contradiction between "short term" and "long construction cycle". To avoid administrative delays, the president created a new corporate-like agency that bypasses Congress and regulation and promotes public-private partnerships to speed up projects. It is a new trend in the governance of West African countries that the government centralizes infrastructure construction and the people evaluate their performance according to the results.
In Benin, the President had created institutions for tourism, drinking water, the living environment and digital technology, and had appointed foreign-educated Beninese to leadership positions in them. These institutions often coordinate resources through international consulting companies to promote the signing and landing of public-private partnership agreements. These new institutions vigorously support new private enterprises and introduce project planning with more commercial expressions. At the same time, the implementing agencies established in the 1990s at the behest of the World Bank have gradually declined. The situation is the same in
Senegal. The country has set up a special "Investment and Large-scale Projects Promotion Bureau" (APIX) to supervise major infrastructure projects, with particular attention to the construction of the new satellite city Diamniadio and supporting transport facilities. This body is separate from the ministerial system and is under the direct control of the President. For African citizens, these undefined "parastatals" have begun to cause administrative confusion, which in effect means the transfer of ownership of public infrastructure from the state to private entities.
Under the framework of "country", the president also has the status of entrepreneur and investor. They legalize their control of state power by combining state power with private sector intervention. For the "presidential entrepreneurs", "rapid urbanization" has become the development consensus of the global South, and also promotes the popularization and prosperity of the cement industry.
(3) The rise
of African-style capitalists who "get rich first and then get rich" The link between construction industry and electoral politics is normal all over the world. Thirty years after Africa emerged from the era of "planned economy", the state has not "disappeared", but has become integrated with entrepreneurs and big capital-especially in the fields of land, real estate and construction, which are the safest places for many investors to deposit. As a result, some financial groups, politicians and entrepreneurs often "roll over" on various "concrete blocks", as exemplified by the recent scandal of the dos Santos family in Angola.
As an outstanding representative of Africa's special political and business relations, Dangote's situation is particularly worthy of analysis. Although he has never claimed electoral ambitions, his links to the Nigerian government are well known. Since the 1990s, successive governments have supported Mr. Dangote's efforts to build a domestic monopoly, offering limestone mining rights, tax breaks, stakes in state-owned enterprises and exports.Local
Nigerian scholars point out that Mr Dangote allied himself with former president Obasanjo to enact a consolidation plan for the country's cement industry. Dangote actively funded Obasanjo's campaign and helped him win re-election in 2003. In 2017, the new president, Buhari, personally congratulated Dangote for helping the country become a cement exporter. With official support and the "strategizing" of corporate social responsibility, Dangote was able to bypass public bidding rules to win contracts, extract rents and maximize profits.
Abroad, Mr. Dangote calls himself an "Africapitalist.". "Dangote" replaced the dominant senior intellectuals in the 1980s as the new national image representatives. Some of these African-style capitalists are actively participating in politics, borrowing the electoral trajectory of Trump in the United States or Berlusconi in Italy, and trying to become heads of state. They personify power, emphasize that they can realize the redistribution of resources, and then strive for legitimate status. In fact, most of these African capitalists have inherited business relationships from the colonial era to the 1980s, and have strong religious, family and community support backgrounds.
But the Dangote trajectory is also groundbreaking, by creating a new model that combines state power with global capitalism. Some of the "new rich" claim to be more low-key than their predecessors, highlighting the links between the company's business and philanthropy. "My secret is to reinvest profits back into the country, not hide money in a Swiss bank account; I live a simple lifestyle and bet everything on the African market," Dangote said, describing his work as "serving the people of Africa.". Although he claims to invest in Africa as a priority, he is also actively turning to the US market, where he has created the first "African Family Finance Investment Office". Mr. Dangote isn't just a cement maker -- he's a member of the world's billionaire class, emblematic of the changing economic landscape in Africa today.
The construction industry has created a new class of rich people in Africa. More and more construction contracts, especially for large-scale projects, are being awarded to local companies rather than foreign companies. The actual controllers and managers of local real estate enterprises are also rumored to be closely related to the head of state. Nigeria's Rabiu (Abdul Samad Rabiu) is also in the cement business, and he is competing with Dangote for the title of "the richest man in Africa". Mahamadou Bonkoungou, a construction entrepreneur in Burkina Faso, is also loved by former President Blaise Compaor Compaoré and has close ties with several West African presidents.
African capitalists are also challenging the quasi-monopolies of European construction companies, and even questioning the need for European companies to have a local presence. French businesses Bollor Bolloré and Bouygues, for example, are often attacked in the media for corruption and fraudulent contracts. In addition to facing criticism of "neo-colonialism" in Africa, European companies are also facing competition from China, which is investing heavily in Africa through the "one belt and one road" initiative to promote infrastructure construction to promote trade. In 2020, China has listed Ghana as one of its preferred foreign direct investment countries and strengthened cooperation with Nigeria in the banking sector.
In the West African region, the informal (or even "corrupt") relationship between officials and cement and construction companies is well known. However, in this context of encouraging development and entrepreneurship, this relationship may be the necessary means for real enterprises, financial institutions and political leaders to "emerge". In the past, investment in Africa focused on the cause of "agriculture, countryside and farmers", and the official formulation of "real estate" and "land" rarely appeared. It is precisely with the shift in the focus of development in the public and private sectors that 30% of the current investment of African millionaires and billionaires has entered the process of urbanization.
Conclusion: Cement belongs to "Made in Africa" and "Globalization"
. Concrete is not only the building material of the material world, but also the foundation of today's domestic and geopolitical order. In West Africa, the emerging cement industry affects the political economy of cities, creating conditions for the emergence and reproduction of political and commercial elites. Roads, housing and infrastructure touch every aspect of urban life, and the cement industry has even more influence than the original oil sector. Extending from the limestone belt, the concrete value chain has spanned unprecedented scale, distance and travel, reshaping the way West African cities produce. Behind the expansion of the
"concrete city" model, it also reflects the lasting and unequal relationship between the "North and South" of the world. Foreign companies are once again coming to Africa to tap its resources, find new markets and reap the benefits of investment and trade. However, under the framework of "African capitalism", the rise and alliance of local political and business elites have subverted the traditional quasi-monopoly position of the West, and the elite representatives have begun to reshape and even challenge the so-called "North-South dominance". The "concrete city" boom in
West Africa has created a new web of presidents, bureaucrats, local governments, municipalities, international organizations, local businessmen, and international construction companies. Among them, Dangote, the "cement tycoon" and "the richest man in Africa", embodies the transformation of "neoliberalism" in this land: his vision of success is no longer the pursuit of "Western values" such as freedom and democracy, but "for the development of African people and countries". Of course, the political economy of concrete embodies a new type of capitalism of "combination of government and business", in which state power and giant enterprises complement each other and provide authority and legitimacy for each other. At the end of the day
, the emerging African billionaires are no longer "in the corner", both politically and economically. Some of them have devoted themselves to domestic politics, trying to replicate Trump or Berlusconi's "path of the head of state". As the richest people in the world, they also invest considerable income in overseas markets, participate in a wider range of global economic affairs, and even carry out reverse takeovers of former colonists. Against the backdrop of West Africa's "concrete cities", a new geopolitical map has been unveiled.
