2024, a capacity management action with "supplementary capacity" as the core has been launched in an all-round way. Over the past
two years, the capacity management action with "supplementary capacity" as the core has basically come to an end. According to the data of China Cement Network, as of the first half of 2026, 356 over-approved cement clinker production lines in China have increased their production capacity by 113 million tons and withdrawn their production capacity by 199 million tons, with a net book decrease of 86 million tons, which is really refreshing.
But another set of facts is equally clear: production capacity has been closed, money has been spent, and some enterprises that have not replenished production capacity are still overproducing. The requirement of "organizing production according to the approved production capacity" written in the document has not been fully implemented so far.

Replenishment of production capacity has ended, but "production according to approved production capacity" has stopped halfway
. The logic of this round of capacity management is not complicated: by means of reduction and replacement, part of the excess capacity is used to "fill" the overcapacity of enterprises, so as to regularize the overcapacity and reduce the overall capacity scale of the industry. The
Ministry of Industry and Information Technology and other policy documents regulating the capacity management of the cement industry clearly require that the daily output of the cement clinker production line shall not exceed 110% of the daily approved capacity, and the annual output shall not exceed the total annual approved capacity. Since this year, the industry has made great efforts to standardize production, but the implementation is uneven. How to control the production capacity of cement clinker enterprises is still a difficult problem in the industry. "Production according to the approved production capacity" has become an unattainable dream in the cement industry of most provinces. What is
really disturbing is not the existence of overproduction, but the adverse incentives it is forming.
On the one hand, compliance enterprises take out real gold and silver, cut meat, shut down, reduce and replace, in exchange for a compliance index; on the other hand, enterprises that have not replenished production capacity have not been fully and effectively controlled, neither undertaking the expenditure of replenishing production capacity, nor giving up their share in production. The same market, the same price, one carries the cost of compliance, one goes into battle lightly, and the abnormal ecology of "those who comply with the regulations suffer losses and those who violate the regulations gain profits" is formed. Enterprises that have spent a lot of money have become complete "suckers".
In the context of the overall pressure on the industry, this problem is even more dazzling. Industry profits have dropped from a peak of 186.7 billion yuan in 2019 to 29 billion yuan in 2025, and in the first half of 2026, the whole industry lost money again, and the utilization rate of cement production capacity has been hovering at a low level for a long time. In the environment where the increment disappears and the stock fights, whoever produces one more ton will grab one more point. When the rules do not have any actual constraints on those who overproduce, the enterprises that abide by the rules are not compensated, but are actually "punished" once.
If there is no difference between compliance and non-compliance in the market, how many enterprises will be willing to take the initiative to stand up and be the "sucker" in the next round of governance? The "last mile" of
regulation lacks a set of rules
that can be implemented to supplement the production capacity to complete the "index compliance", and the next regulation must complete the "behavior compliance". What the
industry needs is not another piece of paper, but a set of clear, unified and implementable rules: the accounting standards should be consistent throughout the country, and different provinces should not say their own words; daily output monitoring should move from pilot to full coverage, and let the data speak, rather than relying on enterprises to report; there should be clear consequences and accountability paths for dealing with overproduction, and it should not stop at reporting; Local implementation standards should be unified and firmly implemented.
To put "production according to approved capacity" into practice, the legal basis, technical path and practical experience of this matter should be sufficient, and the determination and execution of the industry are also needed.
Replenishing production capacity is only the first half of governance; the last mile of regulation has just begun. Closed-loop in the document is not closed-loop, fair in the market is fair-the most should not be let down, it is precisely those who choose to obey the rules in the first place.
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