this year, a number of cement supporting projects with an annual treatment capacity of one million tons of phosphogypsum have made intensive appearances:
Xiangyun Co., Ltd. has signed an engineering design contract for the comprehensive utilization project of 2 million tons of phosphogypsum, which will produce 1 million tons of high-quality cement clinker after the completion of the project; In March this year, Yidu Xingfa Chemical Co., Ltd. announced for the first time the 2 million tons/year phosphogypsum acid co-production cement project, which will produce 880,000 tons of cement (750,000 tons of clinker) after completion. In May this year, Guiyang Kailin Chemical Fertilizer announced the phosphogypsum cement clinker project, which will produce 720,000 tons of cement clinker annually after completion; Xingfa Group has previously made it clear that it is accelerating the project of phosphogypsum calcination to produce sulfuric acid and co-production cement, which is scheduled to be fully completed and put into operation in 2027.
These projects are reasonable in policy, well-founded in environmental protection and needed in industry-but what the cement industry lacks most at present is not new production capacity. Why
is phosphogypsum cement "aggressive"? Understanding why
phosphorus chemical enterprises are keen on launching such projects is the premise of understanding the follow-up problems.
Phosphogypsum is an industrial solid waste produced in the production of wet-process phosphoric acid. For every 1 ton of phosphoric acid produced, about 4 ~ 5 tons of phosphogypsum will be produced as a by-product. As the largest producer of phosphate fertilizer in the world, China has accumulated more than 800 million tons of phosphogypsum in history, with a comprehensive utilization rate of only about 50%, and the Yangtze River Economic Belt bears 82.6% of the national storage pressure. Soluble phosphorus, fluorine and heavy metals contained in phosphogypsum not only lead to strength defects and setting delay in the application of traditional building materials, but also easily lead to environmental risks such as groundwater pollution. Therefore, the harmless treatment and comprehensive utilization of phosphogypsum has become a bottleneck restricting the development of phosphorus chemical industry. The process of
"phosphogypsum to sulfuric acid and co-production of cement" breaks through this blockage at one stroke: after the calcium sulfate in phosphogypsum is decomposed at high temperature, one end produces industrial sulfuric acid to feed back the chemical production and offset the cost of sulfur price increase; the other end produces cement clinker, which is sold as a by-product to generate income. A project, waste elimination, acid production, cement production, killing three birds with one stone, the economic account is quite beautiful. The
policy side has also given full confidence. The Action Plan for Comprehensive Utilization of Phosphogypsum explicitly encourages the resource utilization of phosphogypsum from the source, and some local governments provide policy support for such projects, such as environmental assessment green channel and land priority guarantee, which further reduces the threshold for phosphorus chemical enterprises to start. For this reason, this upsurge will not stop at the above cases, and the probability of subsequent projects queuing for publicity will be more.
For the cement industry, is this a new "variable" or a superposition of old pressures?
If the phosphogypsum cement project is put into the current supply and demand background of the cement industry, the answer is not so optimistic.
In recent years, the problem of overcapacity in cement industry has become more and more serious. Capacity utilization continues to run at a low level, and prices in some regions have fallen to near the cost line. Capacity removal is regarded by the industry as the top priority for the survival of the industry. A number of Hubei cement enterprises said: At this stage, the core work of the cement industry is to reduce, not increase.
However, the logic of the phosphogypsum cement project is that the clinker it produces is not an end, but a by-product-the elimination of phosphogypsum and the production of sulfuric acid are the main industries, and the clinker is just something "brought out by the way". This production logic means that even if the market price of clinker falls, as long as the overall project can be profitable (sulfuric acid is sold and waste treatment fees can be obtained), production will not stop and supply will not be reduced. This is quite different from the operation logic of traditional cement enterprises through active regulation on the supply side when the market is under pressure.
It is undeniable that the phosphogypsum cement route itself has its rationality-it absorbs the real solid waste and opens up the industrial closed-loop, which should not be totally denied. But the problem is that once such projects enter stable operation, the cement clinker they produce will enter the market at a very low marginal cost, which will exert continuous downward pressure on the normal cement price . Traditional cement enterprises can neither gain competitive advantage through price reduction (because the cement of rivals is a "by-product") nor alleviate market pressure by reducing production (because rivals are not constrained by price signals), and the original market clearing mechanism will be seriously disturbed.
Some enterprises say that the phosphogypsum cement project may be "the last straw to crush the camel", although the words are heavy, it is not alarmist. In the
dilemma, is there a way to break the situation? The crux of the
problem has been clear: the phosphorus chemical industry has a rigid demand for solid waste disposal, and the cement industry has a rigid demand for capacity reduction, both of which are reasonable at the policy level, but in the same market space, conflicts of interest can not be avoided. The direction of
breaking the situation may start from the following two points:
First, there are two tasks to be done from the level of capacity policy.
(1) How to control the total production capacity of cement clinker? Starting
from the operational questions and answers on the implementation measures of capacity replacement in the cement and glass industry in the 2020 edition, a clause supporting the resource utilization of phosphogypsum in key areas was introduced into the capacity replacement policy.
At present, the 2024 version is implemented: if the new cement kiln production lines in Hubei, Yunnan, Guizhou, Sichuan, Anhui and other five provinces dispose of phosphorus (titanium, fluorine) gypsum and replace more than 70% of limestone raw materials, the total production capacity of cement clinker in the province based on 2020 can not be increased. According to the disposal amount of phosphorus (titanium, fluorine) gypsum, the number and layout of new projects are scientifically and reasonably determined, and the equivalent replacement is implemented. The production capacity of cement clinker production line of newly-built phosphorus (titanium, fluorine) gypsum without capacity replacement shall not be used for capacity replacement, and the production capacity of production line constructed through capacity replacement may continue to be used for capacity replacement.
The current implementation policy stipulates that under the condition that the total production capacity of cement clinker based on 2020 in the province does not increase, the province will adjust the production capacity of the whole province as a whole, scientifically and reasonably determine the number and layout of new projects according to the disposal amount of phosphorus (titanium, fluorine) gypsum, and implement equivalent replacement.
In terms of specific operation, if 2020 is taken as the base, it will be six years by 2025, and the demand side of cement will begin to decline sharply in these six years. During this period, what is the relationship between the reduction of some non-1: 1 capacity replacement new production lines and supplementary production lines and the base in 2020? Is it to be deducted? Or no deduction? Administrative interpretation by the competent authorities is required. If there is no need to deduct, it will actually form new production capacity, and some cities in Anhui Province are also key areas of environmental protection.
(2) How to scientifically and rationally determine the number and layout of new projects.
To put it into practice, we must have a plan to guide it, and we must have a statement in terms of quantity and layout, rather than a line here today and a line there tomorrow. Those who are not in the planning layout will not go up resolutely, and those who exceed the planning quantity will not go up resolutely. Planning should be authoritative. In the process of planning, cement associations should be involved and the opinions of cement enterprises should be widely listened to. Make the new disposal of phosphorus (titanium, fluorine) gypsum cement kiln production line orderly construction, truly scientific and reasonable.
Secondly, the newly built cement kiln production line for disposal of phosphorus (titanium, fluorine) gypsum will be included in the management of the cement industry, and the production and operation will not be outside the management of the cement industry because it belongs to the chemical industry.
To solve the problem of phosphogypsum solid waste is the way that China's phosphorus chemical industry has to go; and to maintain the supply and demand order of the cement industry is also the basic guarantee for the healthy operation of the economy. The dilemma does not mean that there is no solution, but the premise is that policy makers should take the initiative, rather than wait for the two industries to "fight hard" in the market. If it continues to be laissez-faire, the already fragile balance between supply and demand in the cement industry will only worsen.
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