that year finally came to the "five giants of integration".
Atlas announced in the evening of July 16 that it would build a photovoltaic new energy industry chain project in Hohhot, Inner Mongolia.
slightly after the opening of the market on Monday. Besides the heroic spirit, it seems to add a bit of haste . Mis
reading "monocrystalline silicon" and lagging behind the integration strategy, it is difficult to
compare with the reputation of the "five giants of components", and the reputation of Atlas is actually far more sad than other four giants.
Founded in 2001, Atlas Solar (CSIQ, the parent company of Atlas, a domestic A-share listed company, and the actual controller of both companies is Qu Xiaohua) has been 22 years this year. In the past 22 years, this company, which has plunged into the "specialization" route and only made batteries and components, has always been known for its "stability" in the industry.
"Atlas does not want to be the boss, just want to be the last dead photovoltaic enterprise," the founder Qu Xiaohua said earlier, setting the tone of Atlas's business for many years. Before 2020, the business strategy of
"stability" as the king helped the company go through many rounds of photovoltaic cycles, such as the polysilicon crisis in 2008, the double-reaction in Europe and the United States, and became a global component giant, but in the new wave after 2020, it took the lead in patting Atlas to the "beach". On September 30,
2022, Atlas IPO, which has entered the registration stage, was suddenly suspended, while Jingke Energy, which declared its listing on June 28, 2021, completed the listing process in the same year, and achieved over-raising listing in January 2022, raising a total of 10 billion yuan.
From 2018 to 2020, Atlas realized revenue of 4 billion 438 million yuan, 21 billion 680 million yuan and 23 billion 279 million yuan respectively; Net profit was 1.940 billion yuan, 1.751 billion yuan and 16. According to the prospectus of Atlas, the net profit in the first half of 2021 was negative, which was-335 million yuan, down 122
from the same period last year. As the release of upstream raw material production capacity lagged behind the expansion of module production capacity and other factors, the company's upstream main raw material market was in short supply, resulting in a significant increase in the prices of silicon-based materials (silicon materials, silicon ingots, silicon wafers, batteries) and other accessories.
Affected by this, in the whole year of 2021, the comprehensive gross profit rate of Atlas dropped from 18.57% to 9. At the same time, the company's net profit dropped by 97.39% to 0.42 billion, and its cash flow dropped from 6.742 billion in the previous year to -16
. The comprehensive gross profit rates of Longji Green Energy, Trina Solar Energy and Jingao Technology, which were also affected by the soaring prices of silicon materials, were 20.19%, 14.14%, 14.63% and 13.40%, respectively, and only decreased by 4.43, 1.83, 1.73 and 1. Ates was less than half of Longji at that time.
first half of 2018, according to third-party data, the installation volume of monocrystalline components in China has exceeded 50%, and monocrystalline components have occupied an advantage in the competition of monocrystalline and polycrystalline market. Enterprises including Longji, Xiexin, Jingyuntong and Atlas have begun to lay out the monocrystalline market.
However, after eating the first meat, Atlas did not let go of its hands and feet in the subsequent expansion of production, but still insisted on improving the efficiency of polycrystalline conversion in 2019, and hesitated in the layout of single crystal.
Jingke Energy and Trina Solar, both component companies, basically completed the transformation from polycrystalline to monocrystalline as early as the end of 2020. According to the data of China Photovoltaic Industry Association at that time, the market share of monocrystalline silicon wafers in China has reached 90 in 2020.
To be able to purchase the most advanced crystal pulling furnace and other equipment to achieve curve overtaking, Qu Xiaohua once summed up the road of Atlas's single crystal upgrade, but from the performance point of view, the consequences of the slightly inferior pace of transformation may not be explained by such a sentence.
By the end of 2022, the production capacity of Atlas components was only 32.From
2020 to 2022, the company's component shipments were 11.12 GW, 13.86 GW and 21 GW, respectively. The market shares were 8.06%, 7.66% and 7.00% respectively.
In the first half of 2023, according to the current data, the shipments of Atlas modules were about 14 GW, ranking fifth, followed by Dongfang Risheng. 11.
Where did you fall and where did you climb up late? Atlas, who has
fallen twice, finally decided to run at the crossroads of the new round of industry in 2022. Can he succeed this time? Ccement. Com/richtext/IMG/7xy0ks bu0mf1689815584758.png ">
The first is the component layout. According to incomplete statistics, the TOPCon capacity of the whole industry will exceed 400GW in 2023. According to the previous plans of Jingke Energy, Zhengtai Xinneng, Junda Stock and Tianhe Energy, by the end of 2023, the production capacity of each TOPCon will reach 52.
The company currently plans three N-type Topcon battery production bases in Suqian, Yangzhou and Thailand, only the first phase of Suqian Topcon project is put into operation, and the production capacity is still climbing.
According to the previous plan, by the end of 2023, the capacity of TOPCon is expected to be only 30GW.
Secondly, in terms of accelerating integration, on August 7, 2022, the company intends to invest 60 billion yuan in the construction of a new energy industry chain project in Haidong City, Qinghai Province. It is expected to achieve an annual output of 250,000 tons of industrial silicon, 200,000 tons of high-purity polysilicon, 50GW of monocrystalline rods, 50GW of crucibles, 10GW of slices, 10GW of photovoltaic cells, 10GW of photovoltaic modules and 10GW of supporting new materials after full production. In February
this year, it again planned to invest in high-efficiency photovoltaic slices, cells, components, new materials, energy storage cores and systems in Yangzhou , involving 14 GW silicon wafers, 14 GW batteries, 10 GW components and supporting materials, 10 GW cores and energy storage systems. The total planned investment is about 15 billion yuan.
Including the newly announced Inner Mongolia Fuxin Energy Industry Chain Project with an investment of up to 18 billion yuan in the first phase, Atlas plans to spend more than 93 billion yuan on integration.
93 billion, can you really get what you want? Here, we take the 50 billion Xining New Energy Industrial Park project announced by Trina Solar on June 17, 2022 as a reference. The project involves an annual output of 300,000 tons of industrial silicon, 150,000 tons of high-purity polysilicon, 35GW of monocrystalline silicon, 10GW of chips, 10GW of batteries, 10GW of modules and 15GW of auxiliary materials for modules, and is expected to be completed by the end of 2025.
Furthermore, Digital New Energy DNE noted that after its launch in June this year, However, the prospectus shows that in the first quarter of 2020, 2021, 2022 and 2023, the company's asset-liability ratio is 67.32%, 72.25%, 75.70% and 75%
Furthermore, Digital New Energy DNE noted that after its launch in June this year, However, the prospectus shows that in the first quarter of 2020, 2021, 2022 and 2023, the company's asset-liability ratio is 67.32%, 72.25%, 75.70% and 75% respectively. The influence brought by the "steady" strategy of Atlas has formed a closed loop . Because the return to A is a little slow, the financing channels of the company are narrow before, and the funds of the enterprise are not as much as those of the peers. The enterprise has less money, and the promotion of integration is blocked. The revenue will again fluctuate with the raw material market. Once there is another "2020", will Atlas still be able to stand firm in the first echelon? Will the next round of fighters be delayed in the changing Chinese photovoltaic market with "fast" victory? Why don't
you do it?
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