From 2021 to 2022, the output of polysilicon, silicon wafers, cells and modules reached 827000 tons, 357 GW, 318 GW and 288
respectively. China's cumulative output of solar cells reached 144.35 GW, up 71% from 84.30 GW in the same period last year. Among them, the output of photovoltaic cells reached 39.92 GW in April alone, up 86% from 21.44 GW in April last year.
This is only the output data released by the National Bureau of Statistics. Actual production capacity is much higher.
Taking Longji as an example, the production capacity of monocrystalline silicon wafers, batteries and modules is 133GW, 50GW and 85GW, and it is expected that by the end of 2023, the corresponding production capacity will increase to 190GW, 110GW and 130GW.
It is no exaggeration to say that almost all photovoltaic enterprises have been busy expanding production in the past two years. "The capacity scale of thousands of GW is claimed, and the actual demand is not more than 500 GW." Peng Peng, Secretary-General of China New Energy Power Investment and Financing Alliance, told Tiger Sniff.
In 2022, the newly installed capacity of PV in China was 87.41 GW, an increase of 59. At an industry seminar in February this year, Wang Bohua, honorary chairman of China Photovoltaic Industry Association, said that the new installed capacity of PV in China in 2023 was conservatively predicted to be 95 GW and optimistically predicted to be 120 GW. The global PV installed capacity is conservatively forecasted to be 280 GW and optimistically forecasted to be 330 GW. Wood Mackenzie, an
energy research firm, is more conservative. The agency believes that in 2023, China's new photovoltaic installed capacity will be only 110 GW, and the global installed capacity will be 250 GW. Compared with the nearly 500GW cell capacity planned to be expanded by the head photovoltaic enterprises over the past year, the huge overcapacity has become a foregone conclusion no matter which side of the data is calculated. Silicon materials play a key role in determining the relationship between supply and demand
, whether it is a shortage of supply or an oversupply. PV InfoLink, an authoritative
photovoltaic industry analyst, predicts that China's silicon production capacity will reach 177 by the end of 2023. If converted into modules, it will exceed 600GW, much higher than 330-350GW installed capacity forecast. Similar
to the power battery industry chain, silicon materials have also experienced the dilemma of holding silicon as king, soaring prices, overcapacity and plummeting prices. The unit price rose from 80000 yuan/ton in early 2021 to 300000 yuan/ton in July 2022, and entered the downward channel in March this year. Up to now, the price of silicon material per ton has fallen below the 100000 yuan mark.
An industry analyst told Tiger Sniff that because the photovoltaic industry involves too many links, the chain is too long, and the expansion cycle of upstream silicon materials is generally as long as 2-3 years, it is easy to mismatch supply and demand, and show cyclical characteristics, "When demand is good, suppliers can not quickly release capacity, until capacity is replenished." If demand growth slows down or capacity expansion is too strong, there may be excess supply.
In Peng Peng's view, the imbalance between supply and demand, to a large extent, is also related to the long-term high prosperity of the photovoltaic industry chain, which attracts many new players to pour into the track: on the one hand, the cost of photovoltaic modules has dropped by 50 cents/watt from 2018-2022, on the other hand, the "double carbon" strategy has released policy dividends. The combination of the two has led to the doubling of terminal demand.
It is the optimistic expectation of the photovoltaic market that in 2022, the old players will expand their production, more than 60 cross-border players will enter, and the vertical integration layout will become popular, such as the silicon giant Tongwei entering the component market, and the photovoltaic industry will rapidly enter another "surplus era" from an "over-prosperous era".
Volume is the hope
of living. At present, it is hard to find a hotter and more inward track than photovoltaic. Silicon wafer and component manufacturers are the first to bear the brunt, replacing silicon materials as the hardest hit areas of overcapacity.
Since May, TCL Zhonghuan has lowered the price of silicon wafers twice, and the price of P-type 182 silicon wafers with a thickness of 150 microns has been lowered to 5 yuan per wafer. The price of Longji's two silicon wafers has also begun to decline, with a decline of up to 30%.
In terms of photovoltaic modules, Tiger Sniff learned from a person in the industry that when the industry was developing better, the average price of modules reached 1.85-1 yuan per watt of glass. The average price of PV modules of first-tier manufacturers dropped to 1.6-1.63 yuan per watt for single glass and 1.62-1 yuan per watt for double glass. The price of middle and later manufacturers was 1 per watt.
Obviously, in the case of overcapacity, module manufacturers started a price war in order to get orders before their rivals. This means that a new round of shuffling and elimination is not far away.
Peng Peng told Tiger Sniff that in the past, when photovoltaic modules were in short supply, no matter how big, new or old, customers picked up baskets as vegetables. But now the decline in module prices has led to the continuous compression of the profit margins of photovoltaic module manufacturers, and many enterprises are increasingly confused in the development dilemma. The photovoltaic giants who
have experienced the baptism of many cycles in the industry are well aware that the more critical it is, the more they should strive to be the "volume king". The technology change of
photovoltaic industry has always been very fast, and the most worrying thing for enterprises is that after a project based on a certain technology is put into operation on a large scale, it is not as advanced as the enterprises that put into operation later. Therefore, there are backward production capacity and high-quality production capacity.
For example, the three major technologies of the current mainstream photovoltaic cells are N-type TOPCon, HJT (heterojunction) and PERC. The theoretical limits of battery conversion efficiency corresponding to the three are 28.7%, 30.09% and 24, respectively. Although PERC is the main capacity, its efficiency has reached the limit, and the industry generally believes that the market will be dominated by TOPCon and HJT in the future.
Also in 2022, Longji, Tianhe, Jingke and other component companies have made major breakthroughs in the mass production of N-type technology. The industry expects that N-type TOPCon will fully occupy the market by the end of this year, when the production capacity will reach 270GW, and Perc production capacity will be gradually replaced until it fully withdraws from the historical stage.
Therefore, once TOPCon mass production, Perc is backward production capacity. In order to maintain the leading market share, component manufacturers must lock in advanced production capacity in advance, that is, to expand production for TOPCon. In fact, the head manufacturers do so.
On the surface, component manufacturers are still blindly planning to expand production in the overcapacity stage. In fact, they are trying to replace the old with the new.
The above industry analysts said that the cost curve of the main photovoltaic production link is not obvious, "new players with new equipment, new plants, or the application of new technologies, may have sales or cost advantages.". If the old players do not expand production and update, they will not only affect market share and voice, but also weaken their competitive advantage. Therefore, the head enterprises also need to continue to expand production.
Not only in the industrial chain, but also in the policy side, it provides a boost for the expansion of production. The most typical example is that many local governments give enterprises many preferential conditions in terms of credit and land in order to attract investment. "In fact, they do not need to pay too much cost to expand production, at most it is enough to spend money to buy equipment."."A photovoltaic industry source revealed.".
At present, the photovoltaic industry is full of thousands of troops, like the "hundred regiments war" in the Internet field. Peng Peng believes that "those who live to the end are either ruthless enough or financially strong enough to afford."
But the vast majority of players have survivor bias, always feel that they can find the opportunity to get their own share.
Although the competition pattern of the main photovoltaic industry chain is relatively stable, once the industry reaches the stage of capacity clearance, such as the old photovoltaic giants such as Jingao and Tianhe, the overseas channels are relatively strong, and the overseas and domestic walking on two legs will not suffer too much. However, enterprises with late overseas market layout, such as Tongwei, Yidao, Gaojing and Aixu, will have a hard time because of the lack of brand awareness. As for the coming big waves, the second and third echelons and small and medium-sized players are the most affected.
After a round of shuffling, there will be photovoltaic involution, price war will continue, and the surviving enterprises will have to prepare for the next price war. After all, cyclicality is an inherent characteristic of the industry. Those who are bold in art may have the last laugh.